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This paper proposes a general equilibrium model with non-pro￿t publicly subsidized
universities to show that native applicants do not have to lose from exporting higher
education, as suggested by standard trade models. The gains from exporting higher
education that initially accrue to universities will be redistributed to natives through
increased investment in research and teaching. With Australian university-level data
from 2001 to 2007, the empirical investigation identi￿es the impact of exporting higher
education on native enrollment using the instrumental variable approach: the enroll-
ment of one more foreign student leads to the enrollment of about 0.75 more Australian
native students.
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11 Introduction
In the past twenty years, the number of international students in higher education has in-
creased from 1.1 million in 1985 to 3.0 million in 2007 (Indicators (2009)). Higher education
providers (HEPs) in developed countries collect a signi￿cant amount of money through tu-
ition fees from foreign students: US$3.8 billion for UK HEPs in 2003/2004,1 US$7.4 billion
for US HEPs in 2007/2008,2 and US$2.4 billion for Australian HEPs in 2007/2008.
Besides contributing to tuition revenue for universities, foreign students and their families,
similar to tourists, also contribute to the local economy through their living expenditure.
However, exporting higher education is a more controversial issue than tourism. The main
concern is that foreign students may crowd native students out of universities. In December
2008, an article in The Australian states that "the over-reliance on foreign students has led
to an undercurrent of resentment among many young Australians, who feel these students
are depriving them and their mates of places at good universities." Given the limited number
of universities that a country has, it is natural for natives to perceive foreign students as
competitors.
The conventional wisdom from the trade literature also suggests that native applicants in
education-exporting countries should be concerned. Trade in education is driven by di⁄er-
ences in relative abundqnce of educational capital. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem (Stolper
& Samuelson (1941)) implies that in a world where countries di⁄er in the relative abundance
of educational capital, exporting higher education will bene￿t the owners of the educational
capital ￿ universities, and will hurt the owners of uneducated labor ￿ native applicants to
higher education.3 However, we cannot accept this implication without further investigation,
because the higher education sector is not in perfect competition and is not composed of
pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms, as assumed in standard trade models.
Most universities in the education-exporting countries are non-pro￿t publicly subsidized
institutions, and they behave very di⁄erently from competitive pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms. In
a survey of three representative Australian universities, university executives unanimously
claim that foreign students￿tuition revenue subsidizes native students and enables "better
services and facilities" (Marginson & Eijkman (2007)). Furthermore, The Review of Aus-
2tralian Higher Education (?, p. 5) states that "we [universities] use international student fees
to ￿nance the education of Australian undergraduates, with no mechanism for making up
the di⁄erence should Australia lose international market share." The evidence suggests that
Australian universities do redistribute the gains from exporting higher education to native
students through their internal resource allocation, and that we should take into account
the structure of the higher education sector to understand the impact of exporting higher
education.
The contribution of this paper is to theoretically introduce non-pro￿t public universities
into a model of trade in higher education to investigate the impact of exporting higher
education and empirically identify the impact on the enrollment of native students using
data from Australia during the period 2001 to 2007.
Section 2 presents a North-South two-sector general equilibrium model with utility-
maximizing public universities, which I adopt from the higher education literature (Ehren-
berg (2004), Ehrenberg et al. (1993), Garvin (1980), and James (1990)). Universities are
assumed to have a utility function that depends on two elements: the education quality
they provide to students and the number of native students they educate. Education quality
of a university is determined by its endowment of education capital and its spending on
quality-enhancing activities/research. To enroll an additional student, a university has to
incur an enrollment cost. We can think of this enrollment cost as a custodial cost related
to instruction (education core services) and ancillary services (transport, meals, housing).
Universities receive funding from the government and collect tuition fees from students, and
they allocate their income to research and education of native students to maximize their
utility.
The North has more educational capital in the higher education sector than the South.
In autarky, the South will have a lower education quality and fewer e¢ cient units of skill
per unskilled labor in the perfectly competitive production sector. With complementarity
between skill workers and unskilled labor in production, the South will have a higher marginal
value of skill and a lower marginal value of unskilled labor, which means education has a
higher return and a lower opportunity cost in the South. Therefore, students born in the
South are willing to pay more than what students bron in the North are willing to pay to
3attend Northern universities.
Trade in higher education is not free: Northorn HEPs are required to charge Southern
students tuition fees higher than the marginal enrollment cost. The "extra revenue" from
Southern students will expand the budgets of universities and increase spending on research
and teaching native students. Because it allows HEPs to spend more on research, exporting
higher education increases the quality of education and makes it more attractive to native
students. And because it leads to increased subsidy to the education of natives, exporting
higher education decreases the post-subsidy enrollment cost and increases e⁄ective supply
of university places to native students.
If the marginal enrollment cost is constant, then exporting higher education will improve
natives￿access to higher education because the two mechanisms, through HEPs, both lead
to higher native enrollment. If the marginal enrollment cost increases with enrollment, then
exporting higher education will have an ambiguous impact on native enrollment, because
the in￿ ow of foreign students will drive up the marginal enrollment costs in the North and
will decrease the supply of university places to native students. The theoretical ambiguity
of the impact of exporting higher education on native enrollment, even with university-level
redistribution of gains from exporting higher education to native students, calls for empirical
identi￿cation.
Section 3 investigates the impact of foreign enrollment on Australian native enrollment at
the university level during the period 2001 to 2007. Australia is economically an important
case because it has the most open higher education sector in the whole world (measured by
the share of foreign enrollment in total higher education enrollment). It also is one of the
two countries that report enrollment data by students￿country of origin at the institution
level for a long period of time,4 a necessary requirement for implementing the instrumental
variable approach used in this paper.
The key identi￿cation problem is the endogeneity of foreign enrollment. If for some
exogenous reason some universities accumulate more education capital and can provide better
education quality, they will attract more native students and more foreign students. In this
case, native enrollment and foreign enrollment would be positively correlated, but foreign
enrollment does not cause native enrollment to increase. On the other hand, if universities
4that experience a negative shock in public funding seek to raise revenue by serving more
foreign students, and at the same time digest the funding cut by serving fewer native students,
we would observe a negative correlation between native enrollment and foreign enrollment,
though the decrease in native enrollment is not caused by foreign students.
To solve the endogeneity problem, I construct an instrumental variable using the variation
in foreign demand for university places at the Australian institution level. This identi￿ca-
tion strategy is inspired by Card￿ s papers (Card (2001) and Card (2009)) on the city-level
labor market impact of immigrants in the US, in which Card constructs an instrumental
variable for city-level immigrant in￿ ow using the settlement pattern of immigrants: immi-
grants are more likely to settle in a city that has a large immigrant stock from their home
country (Bartel (1989)). Other things equal, a city with a larger stock of immigrants from
major immigrant-sending countries (e.g., Mexico, China, and India) will experience a larger
in￿ ow of immigrants than a city with similar labor demand but a smaller immigrant stock
from major-immigrant sending countries. In this paper, the focus is the change in foreign
enrollment in Australian universities.
For foreign students, existing ethnic networks reduce both the informational and mental
costs associated with pursuing a degree in a foreign environment. Foreign students have
the tendency to attend universities that enrolled a large number of students from the same
country. For example, Monash University historically enrolled a large share of Hong Kong
students, so current applicants from Hong Kong ￿nd Monash University more attractive
than other Australian universities, because it is easier for them to get information about this
university and they expect more help from the Hong Kong student network once they enroll.
The network theory suggests that a university with better-established networks by stu-
dents from major student-sending countries (e.g., China and India) will have a bigger increase
in demand for its education. Based on this theory, I create a variable by summarizing the
interaction of the existing country-speci￿c student networks in Australian universities estab-
lished from 1989 to 1994 and the country-speci￿c demand for Australian higher education
over all student-sending countries. As long as the supply to foreign enrollment is not per-
fectly inelastic and country-speci￿c networks do a⁄ect foreign students￿choice of universities,
this variable will be positively correlated with the observed foreign enrollment.
5This variable is used as an instrument for foreign enrollment in a regression that uses
foreign enrollment in an Australian HEP to explain the native enrollment in this university
with controls for HEP-￿xed e⁄ects, HEP-￿xed trends, and year-￿xed e⁄ects. The constructed
variable should not be correlated with the HEP- and year-speci￿c errors in native enrollment
for the following reasons: First, the country-speci￿c student networks were determined during
the period 1989 to 1994, seven years from the beginning of the sample period. They do not
vary with time. Also, for individual universities, this was a period when exporting higher
education o⁄ered windfall income and was not of strategic importance, which means that the
student networks are not the results of individual universities￿long-run strategic recruiting.5
Second, each university is small relative to the Australian higher education sector. During
the entire sample period, no university has a market share higher than 9% of the Australian
exporting market. As long as each HEP has a small market share, the number of foreign
students in Australia on average should not be correlated with unobserved HEP- and year-
speci￿c errors in native enrollment. The IV estimate suggests that the enrollment of one more
foreign student in a particular Australian university increases that university￿ s enrollment of
native students by 0:75 with a standard error of 0:29.6
Section 4 estimates the impact of foreign tuition revenue on native enrollment with the
same instrumental variable. In a regression that relates HEP-level native enrollment to tu-
ition revenue from foreign students with the same set of controls, the IV estimate shows that
an increase of A$10;000 (constant 2,000) in tuition revenue collected from foreign students
by a university would lead to the enrollment of 0:9 more native students in that university.
During the sample period, each foreign student brought about A$8;000 on average. The es-
timated impact of foreign students￿revenue on native enrollment implies that the enrollment
of one more foreign student leads to the enrollment of about 0:72 more native students.
In aggregate, my calculation shows that, given the realized public funding, if there had
been no increase in foreign enrollment, Australian native enrollment would have seen an
annually decline of about 5,000 on average during the period 2001 to 2007, as opposed to
observed annual growth of about 7,000.7
62 Theoretical model
2.1 A closed economy with a publicly subsidized higher education
sector
I consider a closed economy with N identical individuals, a competitive production sector
and a publicly-subsidized higher education sector. The production sector uses skilled and
unskilled labor to produce a composite good, Y . The technology is Y = F(Ls;Lu) = L￿
sL1￿￿
u












Individuals are identical and are endowed with one unit of time. If an individual chooses
to remain unskilled, then he or she will supply one unit of unskilled labor and earn the





. If an individual chooses to attend a publicly subsidized
university and become a skilled worker, she has to pay tuition p and spend a ￿xed share ￿
of her time in school; the result is that she acquires q units of skill when she graduates from






Because individuals are identical, in equilibrium they will have the same net lifetime
income regardless of their education choices, which means that p will be the di⁄erence
between the wage income of the two types of workers:











The higher education sector is composed of n identical HEPs, each endowed with educa-
tion capital K and receiving public funding g from the government as a block grant.8 The
education quality of an HEP is determined by q(K;R) = KR￿ with 0 < ￿ < 1:
The HEPs derive utility from the quality of their education, q, and the number of students
they educate, S. I assume their utility function takes the form U(q;S) = q￿S1￿￿, where ￿
indicates the preference towards quality. A higher ￿ means that the university cares more
about education quality.
For each student they enroll, HEPs incur an enrollment cost c and receive tuition p from
the student. The representative HEP behaves as a price-taker, treating tuition p, marginal
7cost c, and government subsidy g as given, and chooses quality investment R and student









s.t. R + cS 6 g + pS:
The research investment of the representative HEP is given by
R =
￿￿g
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
. (2)
As expected, the research investment R is increasing in ￿ and ￿, which means that if an
HEP is more productive in quality improvement (corresponding to a bigger ￿) or has a
stronger preference for quality (corresponding to a bigger ￿), it will devote more revenue to
quality-improving activities.
The enrollment of the representative HEP is determined by the following equation:
c ￿
1 ￿ ￿




The left-hand side of this equation is the post-subsidy marginal enrollment cost. Notice
that the tuition p is less than the marginal enrollment cost c; i.e., students are subsidized
by the block grant g. Here the block grant a⁄ects the enrollment of native students because
HEPs are utility maximizers and they value student enrollment; therefore, when HEPs get
more funding, they will support more students.
2.1.1 Equilibrium in a closed economy
An equilibrium for this economy is an investment in quality improvement R, an educational
quality q, an enrollment of students S, a tuition p, a set of skills and uneducated labor
fLs;Lug, and a return to skills and unskilled labor fWs;Wug, such that 1) HEPs maximize
their utility subject to their budget constraints; 2) individuals are indi⁄erent between the
two education choices; 3) production ￿rms maximize their pro￿ts; and 4) the two factor
markets clear.
8The investment in quality improvement, R, is given by equation (2), independent of other
endogenous variables. And it determines the educational quality, q.
The rest of the six unknowns, fS;p;Ls;Lu;Ws;Wug, are determined by equations (1),(3),










), and the two factor market
clearing conditions Ls = (1 ￿ ￿)qnS and Lu = N ￿ nS = N ￿ Ls
(1￿￿)q.
We can solve the six-equation system by plugging in (3) the rest of the equations:
c ￿
1 ￿ ￿
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
g
S






￿￿ N￿ ￿ nS
nS
. (4)
The left-hand side of equation (4) is the marginal enrollment cost minus the per-student
public subsidy. In other words, it is the representative HEP￿ s inverse post-subsidy supply of
university places. The post-subsidy supply is upward-sloping in S, assuming the marginal
enrollment cost is non-decreasing in S.9 The right-hand side of equation (4) is the willingness
to pay for a higher education place. It is a decreasing function of S because more students
in higher education mean more e¢ cient units of skill per uneducated labor in production,
and lower return to skill and higher return to unskilled labor. Equation (4) shows that the
equilibrium level of student enrollment S is determined when the individual￿ s willingness to
pay for higher education equals the post-subsidy marginal enrollment cost. The existence
and uniqueness of the equilibrium are proved in the appendix.
Once S is determined, p Ls;Lu ,Ws, and Wu will be pinned down in turn by (3), the
factor market clearing conditions, and competitive wage conditions.
2.1.2 Comparative statics
We can now analyze the comparative statics of the model. I will discuss how a change in K,
the education capital,10 changes the equilibrium outcome.
An increase in K, the education capital that each HEP owns, increases the quality of
education, so the inverse demand curve for university places shifts up. Since the increase
in K has no impact on the HEPs￿revenue allocation, the inverse post-subsidy supply curve
does not change given the marginal enrollment cost and government subsidy. Therefore,
the equilibrium number of students S and tuition p will both increase. The amount of
9unskilled labor, Lu, decreases as a consequence of more individuals choosing to pursue higher
education. The aggregate level of e¢ cient units of skill, Ls, increases because both education
quality q and the number of skilled workers nS increase. The increase in e¢ cient units of
skill per unskilled worker, Ls
Lu, leads to a decrease in the marginal value of skill, Ws, and
an increase in the wage of unskilled labor, Wu. This means that the net lifetime income
of all workers increases.11 (The derivation of the comparative statics can be found in the
appendix.)
2.2 Trade pattern
I now examine trade in higher education in a world with two countries, the North and the
South. From here on, I will use x￿ to indicate variables associated with the South and x to
indicate variables associated with the North. Suppose the only di⁄erence between the North
and the South is that HEPs in the North own more education capital, i.e., K > K￿. The
comparative statics in the previous section suggest that, in autarky, the North has a higher
educational quality (q > q￿), more students per HEP (S > S￿), higher tuition (p > p￿),
more skilled labor per unskilled worker (Ls
Lu > ( Ls
Lu)￿), a higher lifetime income per person
(Wu > W ￿
u), and a lower return to skill (Ws < W ￿
s ). I demonstrate in this section that once
the two countries open to trade, the North will export educational services and will import
the numeraire good.
Individuals￿willingness to pay for education depends on three things: the amount of skill
(quality) they will get from the education, the marginal return to skill, and the opportunity
cost. People born in the South have a higher marginal return to skill (Ws < W ￿
s ) and a
lower opportunity cost (Wu > W ￿
u) than people born in the North. For Northern education
with quality q, individuals from the South are willing to pay e pf = (1 ￿ ￿)qW ￿
s ￿ W ￿
u, more
than the prevailing tuition in the North for native students, p = (1 ￿ ￿)qWs ￿ Wu. For
Southern education with quality q￿, individuals from the North are willing to pay e p￿
f =
(1 ￿ ￿)q￿Ws ￿ Wu, less than the prevailing tuition in the South, p￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)q￿W ￿
s ￿ W ￿
u.
If individuals are allowed to choose between universities in the North and universities in
the South, people from the South will apply to HEPs in the North while no one from the
North will apply to HEPs in the South, assuming they have to pay at least the prevailing
10tuition paid by native students. The trade pattern is consistent with what we observe in
reality: the ￿ ow of full fee-paying international students is from developing countries to
developed countries.
2.3 Trade equilibrium
The trade equilibrium is characterized by, in addition to variables that are analyzed in
the closed economy for both countries, a number Sf of Southern students studying in a
representative Northern HEP, and the tuition fees pf these students need to pay.
2.3.1 Equilibrium conditions
In the North, the HEPs now face the demand from people born in both the North and
South. People from the South are willing to pay pf for Northern education while natives in
the North are willing to pay p.
How the HEPs in the North supply higher education places to the two groups of students
depends on both their objectives and the structure of the higher education sector. Suppose
opening to trade does not change the objective of HEPs in the North, which means that
HEPs in the North only care about education quality and educating native students, and
they treat serving foreign students as a way to raise funding. The objective of HEPs in the
international market is to maximize "extra revenue," i.e., (pf ￿ c)Sf.12
If HEPs are competitive in the international market, the competition among HEPs for
foreign students will drive the tuition fees down to the marginal enrollment cost, and South-
ern students will pay tuition pf = c, which is still higher than the tuition that Northern
natives pay. The impact on natives￿access to higher education in the North will be neg-
ative if the marginal enrollment cost increases with students enrolled, and will be zero if
the marginal enrollment cost is constant. The above argument suggests that individuals in
the North have a reason to worry if Northern HEPs compete for foreign students through
tuition.
In Australia, the higher education sector is regulated by the Department of Education,
Science, and Training (DEST). DEST sets minimum indicative fees for foreign students,
11which is supposed to re￿ ect the full average cost of providing a place.13 HEPs are not allowed
to charge a fee lower than the minimum indicative fee. The UK had the same regulation
until 1993/1994, and according to the United Kingdom Committee of Vice-Chancellors and
Principals, the tuition levels in 1997 were clustered around the recommended minimum fees
at the time, suggesting that without regulation UK universities did not compete for foreign
students by reducing tuition.14
How HEPs compete in the international market is an interesting issue that need more
investigation. In this paper, I choose to abstract from the experience of Australia and the
UK. Speci￿cally, I assume that foreign students need to pay the marginal enrollment cost
c and a positive markup ￿, so the inverse supply of higher education places to individuals
from the South is given as
pf = c + ￿;￿ > 0.
Northern HEPs will accept all Southern students who are willing to pay pf for their
education. Trade will occur if pf < e pf. In the North, the representative HEP now has
three revenue sources: government funding, tuition from native Northern students, and
tuition from Southern students pfSf. The HEP spends cSf on activities associated with
the education of Southern students and collects ￿Sf as extra revenue from serving Southern
students. The budget constraint of representative HEPs becomes
R + (c ￿ p)S 6 g + ￿Sf
As in the closed economy, the representative HEP allocates the total revenue g + ￿Sf
to quality improvement and the education of native students. The investment in quality
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￿￿
. (6)
12Native enrollment S in the Northern representative HEP is determined by
c[n(S + Sf)]￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(g + ￿Sf)
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
1
S






￿￿ N￿ ￿ nS
nS
. (7)
In the South, the investment in quality improvement R￿ and education quality q￿ are
determined independently in the higher education sector, because the HEPs receive no ap-
plication from individuals born in the North and the public funding to HEPs does not
change by trade. The aggregate e¢ cient units of skill now equals the sum of e¢ cient units
of skill embodied in Northern-educated individuals and Southern-educated individuals, i.e.,
L￿
s = (1 ￿ ￿)(nqSf + nq￿S￿), and the uneducated labor equals L￿
u = N￿ ￿ nS￿ ￿ nSf:
The South￿ s domestic higher education market clears when the inverse supply of the
Southern HEPs, c(nS￿) ￿ 1￿￿
1￿(1￿￿)￿
g
S￿, equals to the inverse demand for Southern higher
education, (1 ￿ ￿)q￿W ￿
s ￿ W ￿










N￿ ￿ nS￿ ￿ nSf
￿￿￿1 ￿
￿q
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
nqSf + nq￿S￿
N￿ ￿ nS￿ ￿ nSf
￿
(8)
The international higher education market clears when the inverse supply of the Northern
HEPs, c[n(S + Sf)] + ￿, equals the inverse demand from the South, (1 ￿ ￿)qW ￿
s ￿ W ￿
u, as
described in the following equation:




N￿ ￿ nS￿ ￿ nSf
￿￿￿1 ￿
￿q ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
nqSf + nq￿S￿
N￿ ￿ nS￿ ￿ nSf
￿
(9)
Equilibrium conditions (7), (8), and (9) determine the number of native students en-
rolled in a representative HEP in both countries, S￿ and S, and the number of Southern
students enrolled in a Northern HEP, Sf. Northern investment in quality improvement R









u g in both countries are associated
with {S￿,S, Sf}. The existence of a unique trade equilibrium is proved in the appendix.
132.3.2 Comparative Statics
I now turn to comparative statics of the trade equilibrium. My focus is how changes in the
South ( K￿, g￿, and N￿) a⁄ect the number of Southern students enrolled in Northern HEPs,
Sf, Northern HEPs￿research investment R, native enrollment S, and per capita income Wu.
Proposition 1 The number of Southern students enrolled in North HEPs will increase if
there is an increase in Southern population, and will decrease if Southern HEPs accumulate
more educational capital or Southern HEPs receive more public funding from the government.
Proof. In the appendix.
A rise in the South￿ s population15 increases Southern demand for higher education and
leads to an enrollment increase of Southern students in both the South and North countries.
An increase in educational capital increases Southern education quality. Individuals in the
South are more willing to attend Southern HEPs, which leads to a higher skill-to-labor ratio
in the South, hence lower returns to skill and a higher opportunity cost of acquiring skill
(through higher education), therefore, Southern demand for Northern higher education de-
creases. An increase in public funding to HEPs in the South increases investment in research
and improves education quality in the South, leading to a higher level of demand for South-
ern education. At the same time, it increases subsidy to students and e⁄ectively increases
the supply of university spaces in the South. The equilibrium level of higher education en-
rollment increases. Combined with the education quality improvement, this results in an
increase in the the skill-to-labor ration in the South. Southern demand for Northern higher
education will decrease. The decrease of demand for Northern higher education induced by
accumulation of educational capital and increasing public funding in the South will decrease
the number of Southern students enrolled in Northern HEPs in equilibrium.
Changes in the South a⁄ect North through their impact on trade in higher education;
more speci￿cally, the number of Southern students enrolled in the North.
Proposition 2 (On research investment and education quality.) An increase in Southern
population increases research investment and education quality of HEPs in the North. An
increase in educational capital or public funding of HEPs in the South decreases research
investment and education quality of HEPs in the North.
14Proof. In the appendix.
An increase of Southern students in Northern HEPs increases the net revenue to Northern
HEPs. With increased revenue, Northern HEPs spend more on research, and experience an
improvement in education quality. Combined with Proposition 1, changes in the South will
induce changes in the research investment and education quality in the North through the
number of Southern students enrolled in the North.
Proposition 3 (On native enrollment.) If the marginal enrollment cost in the North is
constant, an increase in Southern population increases native enrollment in Northern HEPs,
and an increase in educational capital or public funding of Southern HEPs decreases native
enrollment in the Northern HEPs.
Proof. In the appendix.
When the marginal enrollment cost in the North is constant, Southern students enrolled
in Northern HEPs a⁄ect equilibrium outcome in the North only through their impact on
Northern HEPs￿revenue. Any change in the South that results more Southern students in
the North will increase the institution level subsidy to native education in the North, which
e⁄ectively increases the supply of higher education places to native students. The supply
increase combined with natives￿demand increase due to improved education quality leads
to an increase in native enrollment in Northern HEPs.
Note that a constant marginal enrollment cost is a su¢ cient condition for natives in the
North to bene￿t from increased Southern demand for Northern education due to changes in
the South. A constant marginal enrollment cost means that the Northern higher education
sector can keep expanding at the same marginal cost, which is a rather strong assumption.
For instance, supposing that only people who have doctorate degrees can serve as instructors,
and they can work as R&D workers in non-academic sectors, then the marginal cost to extract
instructors from non-academic sectors will eventually rise.
Proposition 4 (On native enrollment.) If the marginal enrollment cost in the North in-
creases with enrollment, changes in the South that increase its demand for Northern education
will have an ambiguous impact on native enrollment.
Proof. In the appendix.
15If the marginal cost increases with enrollment, an increase in Southern demand will drive
up the marginal enrollment cost in the North and e⁄ectively "crowd out" native Northern
students. Combined with the "crowd-in" e⁄ect through increased university investment in
quality and subsidy to natives, the overall impact of an increase in Southern demand for
Northern education on native enrollment in the North will be ambiguous.
Proposition 5 (On per capita income.) If an increase in foreign enrollment induces an
increase in native enrollment, then per capita income in the exporting country increases.
Proof. In the appendix.
According to Proposition 2, an increase in foreign enrollment induced by an increase in
Southern demand will lead to higher research investment and better education quality in the
North. If an increase in foreign enrollment induces an increase in native enrollment, then
the crowd-in e⁄ect of foreign students dominates the crowd-out e⁄ects. The North will have
more educated workers who have more e¢ cient units of skill and fewer uneducated workers in
production. The increase in skill to unskilled worker ratio means that the wage of unskilled
workers, i.e., per capita income, will increase. All native workers bene￿t from the increased
export of higher education to the South.
3 Native and foreign enrollment in Australian HEPs
from 2001 to 2007
The comparative statics of the trade equilibrium suggest that changes in the South will
a⁄ect Northern research investment, education quality, enrollment of native students, and
per capita income through the number of Southern students enrolled in Northern higher
education sector.
In the empirical investigation, I move from the theoretical world that has two countries
and identical universities within a country to a world that has many importing countries
and one exporting country, Australia, which has the most open higher education sector in
the world. In 2007, foreign students accounted for 27% of total higher education enrollment
in Australia. The increase of foreign students in Australia is the result of both Australian
16universities￿reaction to public funding cuts started in 1996 and the increase in international
demand for their education, mostly from Asian countries.
We want to identify the impact of foreign enrollment induced by changes in the student-
sending countries on Australian native enrollment. Usually, the identi￿cation strategy under
this circumstance will be to predict foreign enrollment using demand-side variables that
do not a⁄ect Australian native enrollment through channels other than foreign enrollment.
These variables, as suggested by the comparative statics of the trade equilibrium, could
be population and the public funding to higher education of the student-sending countries.
However, in a university-level regression with year ￿xed e⁄ects, these country-level variables
alone cannot provide identi￿cation, because they only generate demand variation across time
for Australian higher education at the country level and will be sucked into the year-￿xed
e⁄ects. Inspired by David Card￿ s work on the impact of immigrants on wages in US cities
(Card 2001, 2009), I construct an instrumental variable using established country-speci￿c
foreign student networks across Australian universities and the sending-country-level demand
variation across time. The rest of the section discusses the identi￿cation strategy in detail.
3.1 Enrollment in Australia at the institution level
Consider the following equation that seeks to explain the number of Australian native stu-
dents in HEP i in academic year t (Sit). This speci￿cation relates the number of native
students to the number of foreign students (Sf;it) :
Sit = ￿ + ￿1i + ￿2it + ￿Sf;it + ￿t + "it (10)
Here ￿1i and ￿2i are HEP-￿xed e⁄ects and ￿xed trends; ￿t are year-￿xed e⁄ects; "it are the
unobserved HEP- and year-speci￿c errors.
The HEP-￿xed e⁄ects and ￿xed trends absorb any time-invariant HEP-speci￿c factors
(e.g., selectivity, preference towards research and enrollment) that may a⁄ect the size and
growth of native enrollment. The year-￿xed e⁄ects absorb any year-speci￿c factors (e.g.,
funding available to the higher education sector, college-aged native population, and labor
market conditions).
17If Sf;it is not correlated with "it, we can interpret ￿ as the impact of foreign enrollment
on native enrollment. But Sf;it is an endogenous variable in the model: the education capital
and funding from the government a⁄ect the attractiveness to foreign students just as they
do to native students; fundamental supply factors ￿ for example, the marginal enrollment
cost in the model ￿ a⁄ect the enrollment of foreign students as well; and an HEP that
improves its e¢ ciency in educating students will have lower tuition fees and enroll more of
both native students and foreign students. These mechanisms suggest that we can expect a
positive correlation between Sf;it and "it.
Also, HEPs may enroll more foreign students due to institution- and time-speci￿c shocks
in public funding. In a case study of three representative Australian universities,16 Marginson
& Eijkman (2007) found "as at the other universities, at South Australia it was noted that
the rapid growth of international education had been driven by the reductions in per capita
public funding." A ￿nancially distressed HEP may have to cut the enrollment of native
students; however, its ability to serve foreign students does not change, because foreign
students pay the full cost of their education. This HEP may become more active in the
international market and enroll more foreign students in order to generate income. This
mechanism suggests a negative correlation between Sf;it and "it.
To solve the endogeneity problem, I construct an instrumental variable using estab-
lished sending-country-speci￿c student networks in Australian HEPs and year- and sending-
country-speci￿c demand for Australian higher education (detailed analysis in the next sub-
section).
3.2 Instrumental variable
The key identi￿cation problem is the potential correlation between the institution- and year-
speci￿c foreign enrollment Sf;it and the institution- and year-speci￿c error in native enroll-
ment "it. A relevant and valid instrumental variable should be correlated with the former
but not with the latter. As such a variable is hard to ￿nd, I construct one using the same
technique that Card used in creating the instrument for city-speci￿c immigrant in￿ ows in
the US (Card (2001) and Card (2009)). This method has two fundamental assumptions:
First, situations in the student-sending countries (e.g., China, India, Hong Kong, and Sin-
18gapore, etc.) a⁄ect the country- and year-speci￿c demand for Australian higher education,
but these factors do not directly a⁄ect native enrollment in Australia. Second, established
sending-country-speci￿c student networks a⁄ect foreign students￿choice of universities within
Australia.
3.2.1 Country- and year-speci￿c demand for Australian higher education
The theoretical analysis suggests that changes in student-sending countries ￿ college-aged
population, educational capital in the higher education sector, and public funding to higher
education ￿ will a⁄ect the demand for oversea higher education, and therefore a⁄ect the
equilibrium number of students enrolled in the education-exporting country as long as supply
of places to foreign students is not perfectly inelastic (e.g., limited by quotas).
Figure 1 shows the number of foreign students studying in Australia from top sending
countries from 2001 to 2007. Overall, across countries, there is a variation not only in level
but also in growth (graphs of other countries are available upon request). This variation is
mostly driven by economic factors in these student-sending countries. For example, China
and India, whose numbers of students in Australia have been increasing throughout the
seven-year period, both have a large and fast-growing population, fast-developing economy,
and a relatively underdeveloped domestic higher education sector. Just from looking at
these two countries, one may argue that the rapid increase in foreign students may be the
results of Australian HEPs￿increased willingness to supply to foreigners. This argument is
contradicted by the decrease in the number of students from Singapore, Hong Kong, and some
other European countries not shown in the graph. The number of students from Singapore
decreased from 2002 to 2005, and the number of students from Hong Kong decreased from
2003 to 2006. Singapore and Hong Kong used to have a high demand for Australian higher
education, but their demand decreased when they decided to develop their higher education
sectors and become Asian higher education hubs.
These country-speci￿c time-varying factors in the student-sending countries should not
directly a⁄ect native Australians￿college education decisions or choices of universities.
193.2.2 Country-speci￿c student networks in Australian HEPs
Just as immigrants from di⁄erent countries cluster in di⁄erent US cities, foreign students from
di⁄erent countries cluster in di⁄erent Australian universities. For example, in 2001, the Uni-
versity of New South Wales enrolled 10% of all Chinese students in Australia and only 2.2% of
Indian students and 2.8% of Malaysian students. Monash University enrolled 11% of students
from Singapore and only 2.3% of students from the US. Why do we observe these clusters?
There are at least two di⁄erent explanations. One explanation is from the supply side:
di⁄erent HEPs choose to promote their education in di⁄erent countries. For example, Cen-
tral Queensland University enrolled 2% of students from Singapore in 2001 but successfully
attracted 18% of all Indian students studying in Australia in 2001. The other explanation is
from the demand side: di⁄erent sending countries have di⁄erent social networks in di⁄erent
HEPs and therefore have di⁄erent preferences towards Australian HEPs.
Social networks have been found important in determining the settlement pattern of new
immigrants (Card (2001) and Card (2009)). Foreign students, though not usually legally
categorized as immigrants, are a population of young people who leave their home country
and live in a foreign country for a signi￿cant amount of time. They have to apply to
institutions in a di⁄erent higher education system, live in a foreign environment, and very
possibly study in a di⁄erent language. An existing student network from the same sending
country may o⁄er valuable information and other bene￿ts. The help that foreign students
can get from existing student network starting from the application process to the initial
orientation, to forming study groups, to ￿nding internships, and to graduating with a job. In
many ways, social networks may lower mental and physical costs of pursuing higher education
in a foreign country. For example, students from Hong Kong are more likely to go to Monash
University because they know people who go (or went) to this university and will be able to
share their information and experience.
For the purpose of providing identi￿cation, I would like to use the country-speci￿c student
clusters in an Australian university ￿ as a measure of country-speci￿c student social network
￿ to predict country-speci￿c demand for this university in a given year, then summarize over
20all the sending countries to get university- and year-speci￿c foreign demand for enrollment.
An immediate concern is that current country-speci￿c student clusters in an Australian
university also re￿ ects HEPs￿strategic recruiting. If an HEP su⁄ering from public funding
reduction is forced to cut its native enrollment, and promotes more intensively in large
student-sending countries and enrolls more foreign students, then we may observe a negative
correlation between foreign enrollment and native enrollment, introducing negative bias into
the estimator. The way I deal with the problem is to use the clustering pattern established
during the period 1989 to 1994. This was a period right after Australia opened its higher
education sector to foreign students and before the unanticipated cut of public funding to
higher education in 1996, when the Australian Labor Party lost the election after thirteen
years of governance. During this period, exporting higher education o⁄ered windfall income
but was not of strategic importance for individual HEPs.
Using the foreign student clustering pattern established during the period 1989 to 1994
instead of the one established during the sample period (2001 to 2007) allows us to avoid
the problem associated with university strategic recruiting. It was almost impossible that,
during 1989 to 1994, Australian universities foresaw their funding situation during 2001 to
2007 and strategically cultivated student networks. For that to happen, we would have to
believe that Australian HEPs had a ten- to ￿fteen-year growth plan, felt the need to use the
international market as an income source when it had stable public funding, and had the
information and ability to predict the future developments in the international market.
If instead we believe that, during the period 1989 to 1994, Australian HEPs were not
active individually in the international higher education market, then the country-speci￿c
student clusters had to be determined by other historical incidences, such as country-speci￿c
immigrant population in the city where the university was located, and the openness of
the university and/or its international academic communication before 1989. These past
circumstances do not vary over time and should not directly a⁄ect native enrollment during
the sample period.
213.2.3 Constructed university- and year-speci￿c foreign demand for university
places
With the country- and year-speci￿c demand for Australian higher education and the his-
torical country-speci￿c student social network in Australian HEPs, I can construct the
university-year-speci￿c foreign demand for university places.
To measure the country-speci￿c student social network in Australian HEPs, I calculate
the share fraction of foreign students from country j enrolled in HEP i in year t, indicated
by ￿ijt, using the number of students from country j enrolled in HEP i divided by the total
number of students from country j in that year; then I average ￿ijt over the period 1989
to 1994 to get ￿ij, the average share fraction of foreign students from country j enrolled in
HEP i during that period.
Since we cannot directly observe country j￿ s demand for Australian higher education in
year t, I use two di⁄erent proxies: the ￿rst proxy is the number of foreign students from
sending country j who study in Australian universities in year t, denoted by Fjt.
Summarizing country-speci￿c student-network-predicted demand for HEP i￿ s education
in year t, ￿ijFjt, over student-sending countries, gives student-network-predicted demand for





Of course, Fjt is the equilibrium outcome jointly determined by the demand factors and
the supply of the Australian higher education sector in year t. However, the involvement
of Australian higher education sector as a whole will not cause a validity problem. In an
institution-level regression with year-￿xed e⁄ects, we should not expect institution- and
year-speci￿c errors in native enrollment "it to be correlated with country- and year-speci￿c
variables Fjt, as long as individual universities are small on average.
The second proxy is the number of country j￿ s student enrolled in all oversea higher
education institutions, denoted by F
0
jt. This variable is determined by demand factors in
country j and the supply of all higher education-exporting countries in year t. F
0
jt will not
be correlated with "it if individual Australian HEPs are small suppliers in the international
higher education market.17 In 2007, the thirty-nine Australian HEPs as a whole, even with
22fast-growing higher education exporting during 2001 to 2007, had only 11% of the interna-
tional higher education market. Thus, we should expect any of the thirty-nine Australian
HEPs as an individual institution to be small in the international market and to have no
in￿ uence over F
0
jt.
Compared to b Sf;it =
X
j








weaker and more likely to hold. Using F
0
jt to construct the instrument has two potential dis-
advantages: First, F
0
jt theoretically has more irrelevant information from other international
higher education suppliers like the US and the UK. Second, the variable used to measure
F
0
jt ￿ "students from a given country studying abroad (outbound mobile students)", one of
the student mobility indicators from the UNESCO website ￿ has more noises because it is
constructed from statistics from all the student-receiving countries.18 Thus, the relevance of
b S
0
f;it will be weaker than that of b Sf;it. For this matter, I use b Sf;it for the main regression and
b S
0
f;it as a robustness check of the validity of b Sf;it.
3.3 Empirical speci￿cation
With the student-network-predicted university-year-speci￿c foreign demand for university
places b Sf;it, I then estimate a system of equations of the following form:
Sf;it = ￿ + ￿1i + ￿2it + ￿1b Sf;it +  t + ￿it (12)
Sit = ￿ + ￿1i + ￿2it + ￿2Sf;it + ￿t + "it
Using b Sf;it as an instrument for the actual foreign enrollment Sf;it, along with HEP-￿xed
e⁄ects, HEP-￿xed trends, and year-￿xed e⁄ects in equation system (12), the impact of
foreign enrollment ￿2 on native enrollment is identi￿ed by demand-driven variation in foreign
enrollment that leads to deviation in the native enrollment around the HEP-￿xed time trend,






The main regression uses the Australian Student Enrollment Data from 2001 to 2007 col-
lected by Department of Education, Science and Training (DEST).19 Since 1989, DEST has
collected a wide range of data on student characteristics in higher education, including the
number of students by institution, by detailed classi￿cation of ￿elds, and by country of birth.
During the period 2001 to 2007, there are between 47 and 105 HEPs each year that reported
their enrollment data, for a total potential sample of 459 observations. The analysis is re-
stricted to the 39 HEPs that have reported enrollment data every year since 2001. The 39
HEPs enrolled 92.6% of students who enrolled in the 105 HEPs in the year 2007.20 In this
paper, enrollment is an unduplicated count of the number of students who enrolled in at
least a major or minor course in the reference school year, regardless of their type or mode
of enrollment.
The instrumental variable is constructed using foreign enrollment data by country of ori-
gin and by institution for the period 1989 to 2007. I use the enrollment of foreign students
by country of birth during the period 1989 to 1994 to calculate the institution share distribu-
tions for the ninety countries and regions21 that had students in Australian higher education
institutions during that period. The institution-level foreign demand is then constructed
using the historical institution share distributions and the number of foreign students from
the ninety sending countries and regions from 2001 to 2007.
Table 1 presents the historical share distributions of the top ten student sending countries
and regions among the Group of Eight22 institutions (the historical HEP share distributions
for all the countries and regions are available on request). We can see that there are di⁄er-
ences in the share distributions of di⁄erent sending countries. For example, the University
of New South Wales enrolled 10.8% of US students but only 1.8% and 2.2% of students from
Singapore and Japan, respectively; the eight universities enrolled 31.4% of US students but
only 12.7% of Indian students. This fact ensures that the historical share distribution will
generate variation in b Sf;it across universities in a given year, a necessary condition for the
instrument to work.23 Also, the shares are relatively small, showing that individual HEPs
are small compared to the demand from the listed student-sending countries.
243.5 Main results
Table 2 presents the OLS and IV estimates of the relationship between foreign enrollment
and Australian native enrollment at the institution level. The speci￿cation is a variant of
the system of equations in (12). The dependent variable is native enrollment. The fourth
column includes HEP-￿xed e⁄ects, HEP-￿xed trends, and the year-￿xed e⁄ects. The third
column excludes HEP-￿xed trends, the second column excludes year-￿xed e⁄ects, and the
￿rst column includes only HEP-￿xed e⁄ects. The ￿rst-stage F-statistics for the instrumental
variable from column (1) to column (4) are 59, 72, 19, and 25. The errors are clustered by
HEP to adjust for potential serial correlation.
The IV estimates (top row) are positive and are not statistically di⁄erent from each
other. The point estimates in column (3) and in column (4) are 0:73 and 0:75, indicating
that the impact identi￿ed with demand-induced growth in foreign enrollment within an HEP
is very similar to the impact identi￿ed with demand-induced deviation around the HEP-￿xed
trend. A comparison of the point estimates in column (2) and column (4) tells us a slightly
di⁄erent story. Though not statistically di⁄erent, omitting year-￿xed e⁄ects increases the
point estimate from 0:75 to 1:15, a more than 50% increase. We cannot say for sure if the
di⁄erence is just because of imprecision in estimation due to the big standard error. If it is
not, then the increase suggests that the years when an HEP has a higher than ￿xed trend
increase in foreign enrollment are those when it has a higher than ￿xed trend increase in
native enrollment for other reasons. These year-speci￿c factors, as I discussed earlier in the
paper, may be global common factors in demand for higher education or innovations in the
Australian higher education sector that reduce the marginal enrollment costs, inducing an
increase in the supply to both native and foreign students.
The bottom row in Table 2 depicts the corresponding OLS estimates. The OLS estimates
are smaller than the IV estimates in all speci￿cations. Due to the big standard error in
the IV estimates, the 95% con￿dence intervals of the IV estimates and the OLS estimates
overlap. However, all the IV estimates are outside the 95% con￿dence interval of the OLS
estimates. The di⁄erence between OLS and IV estimates suggests that HEPs become more
active in serving foreign students when their ability to serve domestic students is low. This is
25consistent with the ￿ndings in the case study (Marginson & Eijkman (2007)) that attributes
the growth in foreign students to the decline of per capita public funding.
The preferred estimate is based on the stringent identi￿cation strategy in column (4).
Even though the point estimate is almost the same as the one in column (3), the ￿rst-stage
F-statistic is bigger with HEP-speci￿c trends and leads to a smaller standard error. The
interpretation of the estimated coe¢ cient is that the enrollment of an additional foreign
student in an Australian HEP will induce this HEP to enroll 0:75 more native students with
a standard error of 0:29.
From 2001 to 2007, native enrollment grew annually by about 7;100 on average in Aus-
tralia, while foreign enrollment grew by 16;200 on average each year. The preferred estimate
implies that, given the realized public funding to higher education, native enrollment would
have declined annually by about 5;000 on average had there been no increase in the number
of foreign students in Australia.
Table 3 presents the estimates with b S
0
f;it as the instrumental variable (they will be called
the "modi￿ed IV estimates" in the rest of the paper). Just as in Table 2, the speci￿cation is a
variant of the system of equations in (12). The dependent variable is native enrollment. The
columns have the same set of HEP-￿xed e⁄ects, HEP-￿xed trends, and year-￿xed e⁄ects as
in Table 2. The modi￿ed IV estimates (the top row in Table 3) are very similar to the original
IV estimates (top row in Table 2). The similarity of the two sets of estimates implies that,
if we believe each Australian HEP is small in the international higher education market and
b S
0
f;it provides valid identi￿cation, then we should accept the validity of b Sf;it as an instrument.
The ￿rst-stage F-statistics for b S
0
f;it are 29, 11, 27, and 10 from column (1) to column
(4). Not surprisingly, they are smaller than the ￿rst-stage F-statistics using b Sf;it as the IV,
indicating a decline of relevance. The ￿rst-stage F-statistics suggest that b S
0
f;it passes the
weak IV test, marginally in the most stringent speci￿cation in column (4) (Staiger & Stock
(1997)).
264 Native enrollment, public funding, and revenue from
foreign students in Australia
In Section 3, I measure exporting higher education using foreign enrollment, or the number of
university places that sell to foreign students. The method is intuitive, because most people
relate exporting higher education to the physical presence of foreign students in universities
and want to know if they take seats from natives. Alternatively, we can measure exports of
higher education using the value of these university places ￿revenue collected from foreign
students, and identify its impact on native enrollment.
The following speci￿cation relates native enrollment in HEP i in year t to the revenue








it = ￿ + ’1i + ’2it + ￿1b Sf;it +  t + ￿it (13)
Sit = ￿ + ￿1i + ￿2it + ￿2REV
f
it + #t + ￿it
The revenue data are taken from the Finance Collection and the Research Expenditure
Collection by DEST for the years 2001 to 2007 and measured in 1,000 constant (2000)
Australian dollars. The ￿nal sample has 34 HEPs that report the student enrollment and
￿nance data every year during the sample period.
Table 4 presents the IV estimates of the relationship between native enrollment and
tuition revenue from foreign students. The estimated impact of tuition revenue from foreign
students on native enrollment is positive in all three speci￿cations.
The preferred IV estimate is the one in column (3) that includes the HEP-￿xed e⁄ects,
the year-￿xed e⁄ects, and the HEP-￿xed trends. The ￿rst-stage F-statistic is 12:6. The
interpretation of the estimated coe¢ cient is that an increase of A$10,000 (constant 2000)
in tuition revenue collected from foreign students by an HEP would lead to the enrollment
of 0:9 more native students in this HEP. During the sample period, each foreign student
brought A$8;000 on average. The estimated impact of foreign students￿revenue on native
27enrollment implies that the enrollment of one more foreign student leads to the enrollment
of about 0:72 more native students.
To address the concern that there may be a spurious correlation between the instrumen-
tal variable and public funding to universities, I use the instrumental variable to predict






it = ￿ + ’1i + ’2it + ￿1b Sf;it +  t + ￿it (14)
where ’1i , ’2i are HEP ￿xed e⁄ects and ￿xed trends; and  t are year ￿xed e⁄ects. ￿it are
the unobserved HEP- and year-speci￿c errors.
Table 5 reports how the revenue from CGFA and tuition revenue from foreign students
respond to demand-driven variations in foreign students. The dependent variable in column
(1) to (3) is tuition revenue from foreign students. Column (1) includes only HEP-￿xed
e⁄ects, column (2) adds year-￿xed e⁄ects, and column (3) adds HEP-￿xed trends. The
dependent variable in columns (4) to (6) is the revenue from CGFA. The estimated coe¢ -
cients on tuition from foreign students are signi￿cantly positive and similar across di⁄erent
speci￿cations, while the estimated coe¢ cients on revenue from the CGFA are mostly insignif-
icant and jump around across di⁄erent speci￿cations. The results show that the impact of
exporting higher education on native enrollment is not falsely identi￿ed by some spurious
correlation between public funding and the demand-driven variation in foreign enrollment.
5 Conclusion
Education capital is not evenly distributed across countries. Developed countries have ac-
cumulated more education capital over time and have better universities than developing
countries. The fast-growing population and economy in developing countries generate a de-
mand for high-quality higher education that cannot be satis￿ed by their domestic higher
education system. The ￿erce competition for a domestic university place and the very un-
desirable alternative ￿ being an uneducated worker in a labor abundant country ￿ makes
seeking international higher education an attractive option for the college-aged population
28in developing countries. According to an Australian government report in 2005, the world￿ s
demand for international higher education could increase to 8 million in 2025.
Education capital abundant countries like the UK, Australia, and New Zealand respond to
this international demand by opening their higher education sector to full⁄ee-paying foreign
students: Quotas on the number of foreign students were eliminated; Foreign students are
charged tuition and fees higher than the marginal costs of educating them. Exporting higher
education has becoming an important revenue source for universities in these countries.
It is important to know how the revenue gains of universities from exporting higher edu-
cation a⁄ect native students. Theoretically, with non-pro￿t publicly subsidized universities,
the gains from exporting higher education will be redistributed to native students, and for-
eign students may improve natives￿access to higher education. The empirical investigation
of Australian higher education sector during the period 2001 to 2007 con￿rms the theoreti-
cal positive impact of exporting higher education on native enrollment ￿ the enrollment of
one more foreign student in a university increased that university￿ s enrollment of Australian
native students by 0.75.
The model and the empirical evidence have important implications for public universities
in the US. The US has accumulated a lot of educational capital in their public universities.
Traditionally, high quality public universities act as a magnet for the US to attract high-
ability students from other countries. Serving foreign students for revenue is not common.25
Compared to Australia, the US higher education sector is not very open. As of 2007, foreign
students account for 3.5% of US total higher education enrollment but account for 27%
of Australian total higher education enrollment. While 13 Australian HEPs have foreign
enrollment above 8,000, the top foreign student-receiving public institution in the US, the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, has 5,922 foreign students. In recent years, most
US public universities face serious public funding cuts and have had signi￿cant enrollment
reductions and tuition increases (Hebel (2010)), a situation similar to the one that Australian
universities have been facing since 1996. The Australian experience suggests that the US
could use its comparative advantage in the higher education sector to recruit full fee-paying
foreign students and help more native students gain access to higher education. This calls
policy makers to smooth the process of student visa application and university administrators
29to be more open to the idea of exporting higher education services.
Notes
1The $3.8 billion is tuition fees paid by non-EU students who are charged at a price higher
than native UK students and students from EU countries (Pamela Lenton 2007 "The value
of UK education and training exports: an update").
2The $7.4 billion does not include ￿nancial supports from US institutions. It is tuition
fees paid by foreign students with non-US sources (US Open Doors 2008, Economic Impact
Statement).
3Any model with privately owned educational capital and a competitive education sec-
tor will predict that trade in higher education will hurt native applicants in the exporting
country. Findlay & Kierzkowski (1983) present a two-country model with a for-pro￿t com-
petitive education sector and two goods production sectors that di⁄er in human capital
intensity. They show that the educational capital abundant country will export human cap-
ital intensive good and will have an increase in the return to educational capital. If we
allow the two countries to trade in higher education directly in the Findlay & Kierzkowski
(1983) model, trade again will drive up the return to educational capital in the educational
capital abundant country and will hurt native applicants through increased price for higher
education.
4The UK is the other country that has the same type of enrollment data. The UK is a
large higher education exporting country and would be a good case to study. The UK data
are ￿fty times more expensive than the Australian data.
5Revenue from foreign students has become more and more important for Australian
universities since 1996, in which year the Australian Labor Party lost the election to the
Liberal-National Coalition and the new government signi￿cantly cut public funding to higher
education.
6The estimate is from the instrument that uses the total number of students studying in
Australia from a speci￿c sending country as a proxy of this sending country￿ s demand for
Australian higher education. As a robustness check, I use the number of students studying
30anywhere abroad by country to substitute the number of students in Australia by country in
constructing the instrument. This IV is slightly weaker than the original one, but point esti-
mates are almost the same as the original IV estimate, suggesting that individual Australian
universities are small relative to the Australian higher education market.
7The average annual increase of native enrollment induced by foreign students equals
the average annual increase of foreign student enrollment multiplied by 0.75. The HEP
level enrollment gain is similar to the state-level gain identi￿ed with a similar instrument,
suggesting that there is no spillover across HEPs within a state.
8In Australia, HEPs receive both block grants from the Commonwealth Government and
a per-student subsidy through Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS). As long as
the per-student subsidy does not cover the marginal enrollment cost, we can, without loss
of generality, normalize it to be zero.
9The marginal enrollment cost will increase if there is a limited pool of potential instruc-
tors, classroom and o¢ ce space, etc.
10Notice that K is at the HEP level, and the aggregate education inputs is nK. An increase
in K is equivalent to an increase of the relative abundance of education inputs nK=N.
11The net lifetime income of a skilled worker with education quality q equals (1￿￿)qWs￿p.
Its increase implies that the decrease in Ws and increase in p are o⁄setted by the increase in
q.
12The "extra revenue" is the pro￿t from serving foreign students. I use "extra revenue"
to avoid confusion about the nature of HEPs.
13The full average cost of providing a place has di⁄erent components, including teaching
and research, administration, overhead, and capital facilities, course-speci￿c (e.g., lab) or
common-used (library).
14The information is mostly from a report on comparative costs of international students
by Beck, Davis, and Olsen (1997), in which they discussed how the fees for international
students were set for Australia, the UK, the US, New Zealand, and Canada.
15In the model, all individuals are elligible for higher education, so an increase in popu-
lation is the same as an increase in elligible college applicants. In reality, the improvement
of primary and secondary education will increase the number of elligible applicants even if
31college-aged population remains the same.
16University of Melbourne, University of South Australia, and University of Ballarat.
17Just like the original instrument, the validity of this instrument relies on the assump-
tion that the country-speci￿c student networks established during 1989 to 1994 are not
correlated with the institution-year-speci￿c errors in native enrollment during 2001 to 2007,
cov(￿ij;"it) = 0. As discussed before, it is very unlikely that this assumption is false.
18The UN data do not have statistics regarding Taiwan. The reported estimate treats
Taiwan as missing. As a check, I use the number of Taiwanese students in the US to measure
Taiwan￿ s demand for international higher education, and the estimate is not a⁄ected.
19Department of Education, Employment, and Work Relations (DEEWR) since December
2007.
20A list of the HEPs included in the analysis is available from the author on request.
21Before 2000, some small countries were not individually coded. The country of birth
code I obtained from the DEST has a total of ninety-￿ve countries and regions coded. The
list of countries and regions is available from the author upon request.
22The Group of Eight (Go8) is a coalition of leading Australian universities, intensive in
research and comprehensive in general and professional education.
23If each HEP gets an equal share of foreign students from di⁄erent sending countries,
i.e.,￿i;j = ￿, then there will be no variation in the predicted foreign enrollment across insti-
tutions in a given year. All the variation in foreign students will be across years and will be
sucked into the year-￿xed e⁄ects.
24This is the block grant that HEPs receive from the Commonwealth Government, which
does not include the revenue from the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS).
25Groen & White (2004) ￿nd US public universities set higher admission standard for
out-of-state students than in-state students even though out-of-state students pay higher
tuition, which implies that generating revenue is not the main purpose to admit out-of-state
students.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of existence and uniqueness of the autarky equilibrium
The following is proof that equation (4) identi￿es a unique S. Rewrite equation (4) as
c ￿
1 ￿ ￿
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
g
S






￿￿ N￿ ￿ nS
nS
= 0 (15)







nS . I show that ￿ is a monotone increasing
function from (￿1;1) on (0; N
n ).








1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
g






￿￿￿1 N2￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(N ￿ nS)2S
@c
@S > 0 is a su¢ cient condition for @￿
@S > 0. Furthermore, limS!0 ￿ = ￿1 and
limS!N
n ￿ = 1. Therefore, ￿(S) = 0 has a unique solution on (0; N
n ).
6.2 Comparative statics of the autarky equilibrium enrollment
The following shows the comparative statics of the autarky equilibriumenrollment R;q;S;p;Ls;Lu;Ws;Wu
with respect to K. (The comparative statics with respect to g and N are available upon
request.)
First, R is not a function of K, so @R
@K = 0 and
@q
@K = R￿ > 0.
34Di⁄erentiate ￿ with respect to K, we get
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Proof of existence and uniqueness of the trade equilibrium
Equilibrium conditions (7), (8), and (9) determines the number of native students enrolled
in a representative HEP in both countries, S￿ and S, and the number of Southern students
enrolled in a Northern HEP, Sf.
Rewrite equations (7), (8), and (9) as
c[n(S + Sf)]￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(g + ￿Sf)
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
1
S


















N￿ ￿ nS￿ ￿ nSf
￿￿￿1 ￿
￿q
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
nqSf + nq￿S￿








N￿ ￿ nS￿ ￿ nSf
￿￿￿1 ￿
￿q ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
nqSf + nq￿S￿
N￿ ￿ nS￿ ￿ nSf
￿
= 0 (18)
Denote the left side of equation (17) and equation (18) ￿￿ and ￿
0 respectively. Di⁄eren-
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37The determinant of A equals
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Therefore, there exists fS;S￿;Sf) such that (16), (17), and equation (18) hold. As
long as a33 > 0, the solution is unique according to the Gale-Nikaido Theorem because
a22a33 ￿ a23a32 > 0,a11a33 ￿ a13a31 > 0, and a11a22 > 0.
6.3 Comparative statics of the trade equilibrium
6.3.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Di⁄erentiate ￿, ￿￿ and ￿








N￿ ￿ nS￿ ￿ nSf
￿￿￿2 [N￿q￿ ￿ nSf(q ￿ q￿)](qSf + q￿S￿)






[N￿q￿ ￿ nS￿(q ￿ q￿)]
[N￿q￿ ￿ nSf(q ￿ q￿)]
< 0
38Substitute the third column of matrix A by (0;￿ @￿￿
@N￿;￿ @￿
0
@N￿) and name the new matrix AN￿.
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Substitute the third column of matrix A by (0;￿ @￿￿
@K￿;￿ @￿
0
@K￿) and name the new matrix AK￿.










































39Di⁄erentiate ￿, ￿￿ and ￿
































Substitute the third column of matrix A by (0;￿@￿￿
@g￿ ;￿@￿
0
@g￿) and name the new matrix Ag￿.
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Substitute the ￿rst column of matrix A with (0;￿ @￿￿
@K￿;￿ @￿
0
@K￿) and name the new matrix

















Substitute the ￿rst column of matrix A with (0;￿@￿￿
@g￿ ;￿@￿
0
@g￿) and name the new matrix
A1g￿. The determinant of A1g￿ is
jA1g￿j = a13[(￿
@￿￿









From the proof of Proposition 1, we know [@￿￿















@Sf < 0 is a necessary and su¢ cient
condition for jA1N￿j > 0, jA1K￿j < 0, and jA1g￿j < 0. @c
@Sf = 0 is a su¢ cient condition for
a13 < 0.
















6.3.4 Proof of Proposition 5
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44Table 2: Relationship between native students and foreign students in HEPs










HEP-￿xed e⁄ects yes yes yes yes
HEP-￿xed trends no yes no yes
Year-￿xed e⁄ects no no yes yes
First-stage F-statistics 59 72 19 25
n 273 273 273 273










Notes: The speci￿cations are based on instrumental variables estimation where the actual
number of foreign students in an HEP is treated as endogenous. The dependent variable is the
native enrollment in a HEP. The sample has 273 observations based on the 39 HEPs for the
years 2001 to 2007. The standard errors are clustered by institution to adjust for potential serial
correlation. *** indicates p ￿ value < 0:01, ** indicates p ￿ value < 0:05, and * indicates
p ￿ value < 0:1.
45Table 3: A check for the validity using an IV using outbound mobility of students










HEP-￿xed e⁄ects yes yes yes yes
HEP-￿xed trends no yes no yes
Year-￿xed e⁄ects no no yes yes
First-stage F-statistics 29 27 11 10
n 273 273 273 273
Notes: The speci￿cations are based on instrumental variables estimation where the actual
number of foreign students in an HEP is treated as endogenous. The dependent variable is the
native enrollment in an HEP. The sample has 273 observations based on the 39 HEPs for the
years 2001 to 2007. The standard errors are clustered by institution to adjust for potential serial
correlation. *** indicates p ￿ value < 0:01, ** indicates p ￿ value < 0:05, and * indicates
p ￿ value < 0:1.











HEP-￿xed e⁄ects yes yes yes
HEP-￿xed trends no no yes
year-￿xed e⁄ects no yes yes
First-stage F-statistics 14.2 9 12.6
n 238 238 238
Notes: The speci￿cations are based on instrumental variables estimation where the revenue col-
lected from foreign students (in 1,000 constant (2000) Australian dollars) is treated as endogenous.
The dependent variable is the native enrollment. The sample has 238 observations based on the
34 HEPs for the years 2001 to 2007. The standard errors are clustered by institution to adjust for
potential serial correlation. *** indicates p ￿ value < 0:01, ** indicates p ￿ value < 0:05, and *
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